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I. INTRODUCTION
Proponents of expansive federal preemption of state law damages actions begin their critique of state law with the following: federal regulatory bodies, not common law juries, have the expertise to decide the correct balance of risk and benefit that regulated industries should be permitted to pose to the general public. Once a federal agency has decided through the appropriate regulatory structure that a certain drug is approved or a certain product design is permissible, state juries should not be permitted to second-guess that decision. Federal preemption must operate to defeat the inconsistent actions of state juries because they have neither the expertise to understand the complex factors at issue in such a balancing act, nor the ability to see beyond the individual injured plaintiff, or so the argument goes. 1 This argument has been made successfully over the past twenty years in a wide variety of product liability actions involving drugs and medical devices. 2 The structure and content of the federal preemption doctrine has 4 to the now constant drum beat of the pro-preemption argument in virtually any tort damages action that involves a regulated entity, particularly in the health care field, 5 the question of whether common law tort doctrines should continue to play a role in the regulatory framework is more important than ever-I have elsewhere articulated a number of reasons why I conclude that it should.' The most important of these is the need for an alternative, complementary mechanism to the typically static administrative regulatory framework to encourage the disclosure of, and promote responses to, constantly evolving risk information. The longstanding role of the states in regulating public health and safety, coupled with the inherent inadequacy of any current federal regulatory agency to police fully the acquisition of and proper dissemination of risk information, supports that conclusion.
The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act 8 ("Vaccine Act"), which is the subject of these remarks, provides a unique administrative structure to form the backdrop for this argument. The Vaccine Act established a national vaccine program "for the development of new vaccines and the improvement of existing vaccines and a program to compensate the victims of vaccine-related injuries and deaths." 9 Congress established a "no-fault" compensation system under which awards "can be made to vaccine-injured persons quickly, easily, and with certainty and generosity."'o The Compensation Program ("Program") is the first step for those who suffer vaccinerelated injuries because the Vaccine Act also permits some claims that do The question is: which ones? And, more importantly, should such a legislative directive be expected to respond to the natural evolution of scientific understanding of the regulated risk, and, if so, how? Current express preemption doctrine, which requires an assessment of congressional intent as the "ultimate touchstone of preemption analysis,"" has not fully explored that question. One component of preemption analysis, the "presumption against preemption," which has fallen into disfavor at the Supreme Court,1 4 seems to accommodate the need to consider changes in scientific understanding of risk. When the presumption against preemption is properly understood, it requires an understanding of the tort system as uniquely equipped to respond to the uncertainty inherent in the understanding of risk.
One way to frame this important question was articulated recently by Judge Guido Calabresi of the Unites States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, a long-time prominent tort law scholar.1
5
In his opening remarks for a symposium titled "Tort Law in the Shadow of Agency Preemption," Judge Calabresi articulated the core issues tort law faces in a world increasingly dominated by administrative regulatory action: (1) "Does national centralized decision-making, as between safety and accidents-and as to who bears the cost of safety or the cost of accidents-work better than local, diverse, and diffuse decision-making?;" 6 
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mon law. First, this article provides a brief recap of the state of current preemption doctrine and how it governs the interaction of federal regulation of product manufacturers and state tort actions related to the actions of those manufacturers. Second, the article provides observations on how that doctrine might apply to vaccine injury litigation. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, Inc. 19 involves the preemptive scope of the Vaccine Act and the unique compensation system Congress created to respond to vaccine injuries. Bruesewitz was decided on February 22, 2011, and held that design defect claims are expressly preempted by the Vaccine Act. 20 This article endeavors to explain Bruesewitz in the context of express preemption doctrine generally. This article also provides observations on the continuing value of state tort law in the assessment of unreasonable risk. Finally, comments in response to Judge Calabresi's framing question, asking how to address the uncertainty inherent in acquisition of risk information, will build on the preemption analysis from Bruesewitz to encourage a narrow application of the scope of preemption doctrine particularly in the case of pharmaceuticals and medical devices.
II. MODERN PREEMPTION FRAMEWORK
Preemption doctrine requires, under the Supremacy Clause, that courts search for congressional intent to preempt as the ultimate touchstone of preemption analysis. 21 Express preemption provisions are to be mined for their meaning and scope and in the absence of such a provision, limited doctrines of implied preemption act as gap-fillers where Congress's intent 22 can be presumed based on an actual conflict with state law.
The presumption against preemption is one feature of preemption analysis that requires a nuanced understanding. Historically, the presumption requires the conclusion that, absent clear and manifest congressional intent to the contrary, state common law tort actions-as a reflection of the historic police powers of the states-are not preempted by federal regulato-23 ry action. Congress must be presumed not to displace such actions out of respect for the concurrent, traditional operation of state police powers. This presumption has been described as a fundamental reflection of federalism principles that prevents preemption analysis from becoming a tool of the f9. Bruesewitz 
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[Vol. 8:2 courts or agencies-any branch other than Congress-to assess preemptive scope in some freewheeling fashion to displace otherwise applicable state law, regardless of the perceived value or popularity of that law.
24
The Supreme Court's preemption decisions in the last twenty years have introduced substantial confusion regarding the preemption framework generally and the application of the presumption against preemption specifically. As a result, it seems that there is a tendency for courts to view the topic of preemption very narrowly and to lose many of the nuances that are involved, but that is the world in which courts operate. Courts are looking for a model, a rational framework by which to answer these intractable questions surrounding the concurrent application of state law in an increasingly federalized world of tort duties and obligations. So when the Su-
25
preme Court decides a case like Cipollone v. The Liggett Group, Inc., which found preemption of some common law tort claims based on the federal cigarette labeling laws prohibition of conflicting state law "requirements," 2 6 lower courts, based on expansive pro-preemption arguments of product manufacturers, tended to find other legislative enactments that referred to "requirements" as broadly preemptive in scope.
2 7 Cipollone actually articulated a narrow construction of express preemption provisions in light of the presumption against preemption, but the justices disagreed strongly on the nature of that analysis.
28 I continue to think that Cipollone's determination that "requirements" include common law damages actions in the cigarette labeling statute was misguided. That genie is out of the bottle, however, and the Court has continued to hold that the use of the word "requirements" may indicate congressional intent to defeat common law damages actions.29 The ensuing turmoil over how to determine the scope of express preemption provisions has led to a hodge-podge of confusing, sometimes conflicting, preemption decisions. 
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which preempted state law "requirements." Plaintiff alleged common law product defect claims arising out of his use of defendant's pacemaker, which had been approved under the FDA's pre-market notification approval regulations, a grandfathering method of approval without the heightened rigor of the more elaborate pre-market approval process. The Court was divided on whether the MDA preempted the plaintiffs' claims, but all justices again agreed that the express preemption provision controlled the analysis.32 The majority opinion applied the presumption against preemption and, in doing so, concluded that common law damages actions alleging design defects did not impose "requirements" in this context. 3 3 Four justices concluded that nothing in the legislation, its history, or its basic purpose suggested that common law damages actions were intended to be requirements. 34 Importantly, a majority of justices concluded in Lohr that, while general common law obligations were not a threat to the non-device specific federal requirements at issue, 35 where the federal government had weighed the competing interests relevant to the particular requirement in question, reached an unambiguous conclusion about how those competing considerations should be resolved in a particular case or set of cases, and implemented that conclusion via a specific mandate on manufacturers or products, an entirely different case would exist for preemption under the statute and implementing regulations.36 The search for specific federal government "weighing of competing interests" in subsequent regulatory situations becomes a recurring theme in assessing preemption, both express and implied. 
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THE CASE AGAINST PREEMPTION: VACCINES & UNCERTAINTY
A few years after Lohr, the Court decided the effect of an express preemption provision in the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety ("NTMVSA") in Geier v. American Honda Motor Corp.38 The case, involved an allegedly defective automobile that did not have a driver's side airbag even though the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208 permitted manufacturers at the time to choose whether to incorporate such safety systems.39 Geier, which found implied but not express preemption even though the statute contained an express preemption provision, is a watershed case in the Court's preemption opinions because of its expansive implied preemption analysis. It reflects the power of federal administrative agency position regarding preemption if that position is based on an assessment of whether an actual conflict would "take from those who would enforce a federal law the very ability to achieve the law's congressionally mandated objectives that the constitution, through the operation of ordinary preemption principles, seeks to protect."40 The Court was persuaded in Geier to apply implied conflict preemption principles out of concern for the "careful regulatory scheme" established by NTMVSA, despite the arguably plain meaning of the savings clause.
The Court's treatment of common law damages actions in Geier illustrates the Court's uncertainty about the value of traditional state law's regulatory value, even in cases where preemption is being implied. The Geier Court perceived that common law tort actions might be detrimental to thoughtfully established federal goals,41 even in the face of congressional intent to the contrary as evidenced by the savings clause. The Court weighed the perceived federal regulatory objectives against the general interest the states have in promoting health and welfare and compensating citizens for injuries suffered by defective products.42 It was somewhat sympathetic to state concerns of compensating victims and enhancing product safety, but concluded that jury-assessed standards would lead to unpredictability and uncertainty in the standard of care.43 The Court did not mention the presumption against preemption. 44 The Geier analysis, which broadly assessed federal objectives under implied preemption analysis, has Act, relevance of agency position debated).
38. been criticized for its potential to encourage judicial over-reaching of state law prerogatives.
45
. The Court has also relied variously on the federal government's position on preemption, either through agency action or government litigating position, to establish intent to preempt. Lohr involved a specific agency rule promulgated to define the scope of the MDA preemption provision prior to litigation and the Court was "substantially informed" by it.46 The government's position in Geier was found in a wide-ranging assessment of the history of the regulation and the current Secretary's position in the litigation as well as predecessor Secretary's opinions.47 In the eight years between Cipollone and Geier, the Court contracted the operation of traditional state tort laws substantially and therefore increased the likelihood that propreemption arguments would be made based on federal regulatory action. The Court also resisted discussing the presumption against preemption and increasingly relied on agency assessments of the role of state tort law as complementary to federal regulatory action. 
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THE CASE AGAINST PREEMPTION: VACCINES & UNCERTAINTY were EPA. 50 The Court reiterated, however, its adherence to the presumption against preemption because tort litigation "provide[s] an incentive to manufacturers to use the utmost care in the business of distributing inherently dangerous items."
The Court narrowly analyzed the express preemption provision, as it had done in Cipollone, specifically rejecting the conclusion that common law jury verdicts are the equivalent of "requirements" simply because they may influence decision-making. 52 The Court also expressed a sense of frustration at the way the lower courts had read the term "requirements" broadly after Cipollone, and chastised the "too quick conclusion" 53 that tort claims were always preempted under statutes that used that term. The Court concluded that the express preemption provision preempted very few claims, 54 stating, "if Congress had intended to [prevent the operation] of a long available form of compensation, it surely would have expressed that intent more clearly." 55 The Court endorsed the parallel operation of common law tort claims, stating they "would seem to aid, rather than hinder, the functioning of FIFRA . .. [which] contemplates that pesticide labels will evolve over time, as manufacturers gain more information about their products' performance in diverse settings ... [T]ort suits can serve as a catalyst in this process." 56 Three years later, the Court returned to express preemption under the FDCA MDA. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. 5 7 involved allegations of design defect in devices approved through the pre-market approval process.
5 8 The Court was quite critical of the role of common law tort claims in regulating product safety, unlike its position in Bates, and was quite expansive in its description of the scope of express preemption. 59 The Court, speaking through Justice Scalia, seemed less interested in assessing congressional intent to preempt, which it had done in two prior cases, than in re-affirming its own understanding of the statute's term "requirements."
6 0 The Court declared that "requirements" includes common law tort claims, stating: "Congress is entitled to know what meaning this Court will assign to terms regularly used in its enactments. Absent other indication, reference to a State's 'requirements' includes its common-law duties." 6 1 This conclusion, which seems contrary to Bates' analysis and sentiment, is the kind of inconsistency that makes express preemption analysis so fraught with uncertainty.
While thus defining the term "requirement" for future congresses, the Court reiterated its pre-Bates distrust over the operation of common law tort actions. Justice Stevens, the originator of modem preemption analysis in Cipollone, had come to speak positively about the general value of state tort law as a complement to federal regulation, as indicated by his opinion in Bates. Justice Scalia, the author of Riegel, on the other hand, finds tort law as applied by juries to be "less deserving of preservation" than other state regulations. His stated rationale is that juries are incapable of balancing costs and benefits adequately as they "see[] only the costs of a more dangerous design, and [are] not concerned with [the] benefits" consumers reap by the manufacturer's design choices.62 The Riegel Court found it "implausible" that Congress would create the "perverse distinction" that grants greater power to a single state jury than to state officials.63 There is no mention of the "presumption against preemption." There is certainly little regard in these remarks for tort law's historic place in contributing to public safety or for its "catalyzing" effect to increase access to risk information as discussed in Bates. 6 The final pre-Bruesewitz express preemption case meriting discussion is Altria Group, Inc. v. Good Levine involved the anti-nausea drug Phenergan that had been approved in 1955. 75 Plaintiff lost her arm as a result of inadvertent injection of the migraine drug into an artery, which resulted in gangrene, a risk of which W eth was aware and which had been warned about in the product's labeling. Ms. Levine claimed that the labeling inadequately warned of the risk of gangrene, and the jury agreed.
7 7 The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed a lower court ruling that Ms. Levine's claims were not impliedly preempted by the FDA's labeling approvals. Wyeth made two separate implied conflict preemption arguments: first that it would have been impossible for it to comply with the state law duty to warn without violating federal law, and, second, that recognition of the plaintiffs claims would act as an obstacle to the accomplishment of federal objectives because it substitutes a lay jury's decision for the expert judgment of the FDA. 79 The Court, again speaking through Justice Stevens with a six-to-three majority, found that the FDA's product labeling approvals did not impliedly preempt Levine's tort claims under either impossibility or obstacle implied preemption.
The Court re-affirmed the "two cornerstones of our pre-emption jurisprudence" 8I first, that the purpose of Congress is the "'ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case"' and, second, "in all pre-emption cases," 83 but particularly those involving fields which the states have traditionally occupied, the analysis begins with the presumption against preemption. The Court rejected Wyeth's argument that the presumption should not apply in implied preemption cases, stating, 84 The Court emphasized that "through many amendments to the FDCA and to FDA regulations, it has remained a central premise of federal drug regulation that the manufacturer bears responsibility for the content of its label at all times." 85 The Court required "clear evidence" before an impossible conflict is established.
There was no evidence that the FDA gave more than "passing attention" to the issue and certainl no affirmative decision to prohibit Wyeth from strengthening its warning.
The Court's discussion of implied obstacle conflict preemption principles is important because of the contrast with the discussion in Geier. Implied obstacle preemption, according to the Levine Court, requires two things: (1) an identification of the congressional purposes or objectives which support the federal law and, (2) a rigorous assessment of whether Congress considered state law claims to pose an obstacle to the accomplishment of those objectives, not just the agency charged with effectuating Congress' intent. Borrowing from the successful obstacle conflict preemption analysis in Geier, Wyeth had argued that Levine's tort claims were preempted because "they interfere with 'Congress's purpose to entrust an expert agency to make drug labeling decisions that strike a balance between competing objectives.' 8 8
The Court rejected these arguments because they relied on an "untenable interpretation of congressional intent and an overbroad view of an agency's power to pre-empt state law."8 9 Relying on an argument that had been successful in Geier, Wyeth contended that once the FDA approves a drug's label, that decision reflects both a floor and a ceiling for regulation and state law may not hold that decision inadequate.90 The Court summarily rejected this assessment of federal objectives because it was contrary to all evidence of Congress's purposes. 9 1 The Court explored the history of federal regulation of pharmaceutical approvals and was influenced by Congress's failure to expressly preempt, stating, "If Congress thought state-law suits posed an obstacle to its objectives, it surely would have enacted an express pre-emption provision at some point during the FDCA's 70-year history."
The Court found congressional silence, in the face of "awareness" of concurrent state tort litigation, to be "powerful evidence that Congress did not intend FDA oversight to be the exclusive means of ensuring 84 drug safety and effectiveness." 9 3 The Court explored the many ways that tort law acts as a complement to federal drug regulation, 94 and found the FDA's "newfound opinion" to the contrary to be inconsistent with the "longstanding coexistence of state and federal law and the FDA's traditional recognition of state-law remedies" 95 and, thus, unpersuasive on assessing a current conflict with federal objectives.
Wyeth v. Levine represents a narrower implied obstacle conflict preemption analysis than Geier. The Court seems to have settled into a more balanced approach to the value of state common law tort actions within its implied conflict preemption analysis if not so clearly in its express preemption analysis.
IV. SYNTHESIS OF PREEMPTION ANALYSIS
The Court has at times stated that the presumption against preemption of historic state police powers continues to operate in cases of both express and implied preemption. The Court has also evaluated express preemption provisions without reference to the presumption, as in Riegel. In Cipollone, Lohr, Bates, and Altria Group, the Court required clear and manifest intent of Congress to the contrary to defeat the presumption. The presumption was also important in Wyeth v. Levine. The question remaining is whether the presumption will, indeed, operate as a default in express preemption cases where the statutory language of preemption does not lend itself to a finding of clear congressional intent. Bruesewitz provides an answer to that question though it is unclear what the extent of Bruesewitz's reach will be.
When an express preemption provision provides "clear and manifest" evidence of Congress's intent, it will control. 96 Justice Stevens, in Cipollone, Lohr, Bates, Altria Group, and, to a lesser extent, in his concurrence in Riegel, provides the best statement of the current manner of interpreting express preemption provisions to discern congressional intent: narrowly based on the ordinary meaning of the statute's terms, its structure, purposes, and history, with an understanding that Congress would not defeat the operation of traditional, historic police powers of the states without explicitly 93. Id. Further, "[Congress] may also have recognized that state-law remedies further consumer protection by motivating manufacturers to produce safe and effective drugs and to give adequate warnings." Id. at 1199-1200 (alteration in original). The Court rejected reliance on the FDA's "mere assertion" that state law poses an obstacle. Id. at 1201. Instead, it confirmed that "[t]he weight we accord the agency's explanation of state law's impact on the federal scheme depends on its thoroughness, consistency, and persuasiveness." Id.
94. Id. at 1202. "State tort suits uncover unknown drug hazards and provide incentives for drug manufacturers to disclose safety risks promptly. They also serve a distinct compensatory function that may motivate injured persons to come forward with information. Failure-to-warn actions, in particular, lend force to the FDCA's premise that manufacturers, not the FDA, bear primary responsibility for their drug labeling at all times." Id. saying So.97 All of this seems to suggest that a "new" presumption against preemption operates as a meaningful default rule when interpreting congressional intent to preempt. 98 Clarity is in the eyes of the beholder, as the different results in Riegel and Altria Group suggest. Even though the Court did not mention the presumption in Riegel, the discussion in Altria Group on the heels of Riegel might portend that a majority has rejected a lesser role for the presumption in express preemption cases.
"The Court seems intent on assessing statutory language with particularity, to discern whether the terms used, such as "requirements," "statements," or "standards," fairly include state common law claims under the relevant statute's history alone, and not with reference to use of the terms in other statutory schemes." 99 This text-centered focus has arisen after years of attempting to force terms from one statute, such as "requirements," to apply to the meaning of the same term in a different statute."oo The presumption against preemption as default may reduce the overreaching of statutory definitions by requiring a tighter fit between context and language. 10 
V. VACCINE ACT PREEMPTION: BRUESEWITZ V. WYETHLLC
If the Court's analysis of express preemption provisions teaches anything, it is that statutes are unique, and so is the search for congressional intent based on statutory text. Relying on the interpretation of terms from one statute runs the risk of proving too much in the interpretation of similar language in another statute. In an earlier article, I proposed that recent Vaccine Act cases, including Bruesewitz, would put this analysis to the test.1 02 The Court has now answered the question by finding preemption in a hyper-textual analysis which does not refer to the presumption against preemption, or to other elements of preemption doctrine for that matter.
There is no question that vaccination of children has been spectacularly successful in eradicating the disastrous consequences of many childhood illnesses. There is also no question that vaccinating a child introduces a toxin into the child's system that may cause a devastating side effect. Those side effects are inevitable in some portion of the vaccinated population. The Vaccine Act was intended to compensate, under a no-fault regime, children who were injured from a vaccination, and the only question is which state tort laws survived the creation of the compensation scheme and which ones did not. 03 Tort laws historically have been seen as a complement to federal drug regulation by courts and federal regulators.""' Tort actions uncover unknown hazards and provide incentives for drug manufacturers to disclose safety risks promptly. They also serve a distinct compensatory function that may motivate injured persons to come forward with and uncover information about previously undisclosed or under-disclosed risks. The FDCA's "central premise" is that manufacturers bear primary responsibility for their drug labeling at all times. 05 The same is true of vaccine manufacturers who are regulated under the Public Health Service Act,1 0 6 the FDCA,10 7 and the Vaccine Act. os Vaccine licenses are granted if vaccine manufacturers meet standards designed "to insure the continued safety, purity, and potency" of vaccines.'
09 Since 1972, the FDA has regulated vaccines and other biologics under the New Drug Application process."o To obtain approval, the manufacturer need not establish that the vaccine is the safest possible, nor that there are no feasible alternative formulations."' 1 Rather, the FDA is not involved in initiating or conceptualizing the structure of a vaccine. The FDA is not a drug or vaccine design agency: it is an approval agency. It has limited authority to require post-marketing monitoring which is "not a top priority."ll 2 The FDA relies on the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System ("VAERS"), a passive reporting system that relies on voluntary reporting of adverse events that are inevitably underreported." 3 Nor does it have authority to require a manufacturer to adopt a safer alternative for a licensed made Hannah's vaccine, voluntarily discontinued making the whole-cell pertussis vaccine in 1998.123 Hannah's parents sought compensation from the Vaccine Court in April 1995 for Hannah's injuries which, until one month before, had been In an earlier article, I opined that the Court should find that the statute did not preempt all design defect litigation.1 2 8 The statute appears on its face to carve out some design defect claims that are not preempted by using the term "unavoidable." The statute is complex and its structure and history seem to admit of different conclusions regarding preemptive intent. The case presents a unique federal compensation scheme, however, which clearly displaces the operation of a substantial amount of state common law by its very terms.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, finds preemption based entirely on an analysis of the text.1 29 After explaining the impetus for the Act, and describing the no-fault compensation system, the majority 128. Davis, The "New" Presumption, supra note 3, at 1251 ("Ferrari may have the better analysis because it recognizes that the compensation scheme Congress created did not specifically articulate those claims that may be deemed unavoidable. . . . The presumption against preemption, requiring a narrow reading of the terms of a statute with a view to maintain state law absent clear evidence to the contrary, supports, in principle, the result in Ferrari-not all design defects in vaccines are the result of unavoidable conditions. Proof of Congress's intent will also, of course, be assessed by reference to the legislative history and the purposes behind the compensation scheme. If clear preemptive intent can be derived, it will control."). [Vol. 8:2tion scheme, that if Congress had wanted to create a different kind of scheme, say a truly exclusive compensation scheme, it could have said so much more clearly than it did. That criticism proves too much because it will, in hindsight, always be true of any legislative enactment. Tort litigation operating as a background to the Vaccine Act administrative scheme supports both the compensatory purpose of the Act and the incentive to create safer vaccines, but not as neatly as in cases in which there is no congressionally created compromise compensation scheme. The majority concluded that Congress need not create a compensation system that mirrors the tort litigation system to have intended to preempt that system. 155 That is fair. It also strikes me that Bruesewitz is unlikely to have broad impact on preemption of common law tort claims given the unique nature of the congressional compensation scheme in issue.
VI. THE ROLE OF UNCERTAINTY
Vaccines have side effects, many of which are known, but not all. Information about the true nature of what such toxins do once introduced into the body, like what drugs do to the body, is produced over time-decades perhaps. Information about the risks known when a vaccine or other drug is approved immediately becomes out of date as soon as that vaccine or drug is widely used in the general population. The larger the population exposed to a drug or vaccine, the greater the potential of unanticipated side effects and the greater the need to acquire and respond to that knowledge to enhance public safety. I have always advocated that the tort litigation system provides the incentive for drug manufacturers to acquire and act on that knowledge of which only they are fully aware. The FDA, nor any regulatory agency, is simply incapable of acquiring and acting on that information as effectively as the manufacturer. Many have commented on the FDA's inability to track post-marketing adverse events of pharmaceuticals it approves. 156 The manufacturer is in command of that information. "Science aims at the truth without ever being certain.,' 5 The truth is illusory. The Vaccine Program that Congress created to respond to the known risks of childhood vaccines in 1986 was laudable. But time passes, and additional risks become realized. Who has the incentive to make the population aware of those risks? The well-intentioned federal regulators 155. Id. at 1079-82. 156. Id. at 1099, n.20 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ("[W]e observed in Levine that the FDA is perpetually understaffed and underfunded, and the agency has been criticized in the past for its slow response in failing to withdraw or warn about potentially dangerous products. These practical shortcomings reinforce the conclusion that 'state law offers an additional, and important, layer of consumer protection that complements FDA regulation."' (internal citations omitted)). The Vaccine Injury Compensation Program is a good model because it incorporates the opportunity to add vaccines and injuries to the Vaccine Table over time. Unfortunately, more injuries have been removed from the Table than have been added to it in the past decades,' 6 1 and vaccines have been added with no corresponding injury side effect identified. That in itself may be the result of inadequate information. There continues to be a need to maximize avenues for acquiring information about vaccine risks. The ever present possibility of the operation of the tort system as a watchdog fulfills that role, but the tort system does not fit cleanly into the process, and is often an inefficient solution. Often, the system is used as a sledge hammer instead of the proverbial scalpel, but many safeguards of that system have been in place for decades; the burden of proof, the requirement of general and special causation, the expense of discovery and cost of litigation to all the parties to name a few. These are significant deterrents to widespread overuse of the civil action instead of the administrative scheme that Congress put in place.
DICTIONARY OF THE HISTORY OF
It is such cases in which the presumption against preemption should operate to preserve longstanding traditional tort laws of responsibility. Product manufacturers, including vaccine manufacturers, have regulatory and market incentives to improve their products performance, but the everpresent possibility of the tort system operating to uncover the risks of which only the manufacturer realistically will be aware is a powerful one. Yes,
